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Globalization and Civil Society-Continuities,
Ambiguities, and Realities in Latin America
LucY TAYLOR*
INTRODUCTION
It is a truism of contemporary international political studies that
globalization is becoming an increasingly potent force in political life, and
nowhere is this increase more apparent than in the established political
systems of Latin America. Walking down any street in any Latin American
town, one is confronted with the lived reality of globalization; illegal street
vendors sell cheap goods made in the Far Eastern Free Trade Zones; teenagers
wear "Chicago Bulls" baseball hats; shops blare the music of U2, Guns 'n'
Roses, and Gloria Estefan; and German backpackers buy "authentic" trinkets
from a woman with a long black plait hanging down to her many-layered
skirts. All this occurs alongside the distribution of baby bottles by the United
Nations Children's Fund, the leafleting of passers-by as part of the voter
education program funded by the Ford Foundation for Democracy, or the
hammering sound coming from the nearby construction site of a community
health center, courtesy of the Swedish government.
The patterns of connection and enmeshing that this vignette conjures are
complex and give us an idea, if not a quantifiable measure, of what
globalization means to ordinary people. The most obvious manifestation of
globalization is the neo-liberal economic revolution that is occurring at a pace
and in ways that are beyond the control of one actor or institution. As such,
much of the literature on globalization tends to focus on changes in the
structure of international financial patterns or trade,' on the activities and
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1. See ROBERT W. COX, WITH TIMOTHYJ. SINCLAIR, APPROACHES TO WORLD ORDER 524-36 (1996);
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN TRANSITION (P.W. Daniels & William Lever eds., 1996); YORK W. BRADSHAW
& MICHAEL WALLACE, GLOBAL INEQUALITIES (1996); JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF
SOVEREIGNTY?: THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992); INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY: STATE-MARKET RELATIONS IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER (C. Roe Goddard
et al. eds., 1996); RICHARD O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GEOGRAPHY (1992).
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policies of the major financial institutions,2 and on the neo-liberal economic
orthodoxy that they advocate,3 as well as the development of transnational
economic entities that are free from national responsibilities or are outside the
jurisdiction of governments.4 Those who focus on political changes point to
the concentration of power in those countries that dominate the economic
sphere,5 the erosion of governmental power over domestic policy (especially
in poorer countries), as well as the development of international law and
the United Nations as centers for global political contestation.6 Such
developments are intimately linked to the central ideological concept of
2. See PAUL J. NELSON, THE WORLD BANKANDNON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: THELIMITS
OF APOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1995); Manuel Pastor, Jr., The Effects of IMF Programs in the Third
World: Debate and Evidence from Latin America, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: STATE-
MARKET RELATIONS IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 247; K. Sarwar Lateef, The World
Bank: Its First Half Century, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: STATE-MARKET RELATIONS IN THE
CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER, supra note I, at 291; TONY KILLICK, IMF PROGRAMMES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: DESIGN AND IMPACT (1995); IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING
WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS 53-202 (1991) (discussing social and political issues in World Bank
operations). For a more critical approach to the work of such institutions, see BEYOND BRETTON WOODS:
ALTERNATIVES TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (John Cavanagh et al. eds., 1994); Bruce Rich, World
Bank/IMF 50 Years Is Enough, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: STATE-MARKET RELATIONS
IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 305.
3. This focus is on structural adjustment. See Steven Gill, Globalization, Market Civilization and
Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism, 24 MILLENNIUM -399; THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS:
INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS, DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS, AND THESTATE (Stephen Haggard & Robert R.
Kaufman eds., 1992); Rosario Espinal, Development, Neoliberalism and Electoral Politics in Latin
America, DEV. & CHANGE, Oct. 1992, at 27. For country-specific examples, see Philip O'Brien,
Authoritarianism andthe New Economic Orthodoxy: The Political Economy ofthe Chilean Regime 1975-
1983, in GENERALS IN RETREAT: THE CRISIS OF MILITARY RULE IN LATIN AMERICA 144 (Philip O'Brien
& Paul Cammack eds., Manchester Univ. Press 1985); William C. Smith, State, Market and Neoliberalism
in Post-Transition Argentina: The Menem Experiment, J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF., Winter
1991, at 45.
4. See, e.g., MARK CASSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GLOBAL INTEGRATION (1992); JOHN H.
DUNNING, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1993) (discussing impacts of
multinational corporations); ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE AND THE STATE (1994) (providing a critical historical account ofthe development of multinational
corporations).
5. On the western ideological dominance of democratization, see Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods,
Globalisation and Inequality, 24 MILLENNIUM 447 (1995); TONY EVANS, US HEGEMONY AND THE
PROJECT OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 101-20 (1996); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE:
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 85-98 (1991). For a general assessment ofliberal
democracy's spread, see Larry Diamond, The Globalization of Democracy, in GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION
AND THE THIRD WORLD 31 (Robert O. Slater et al. eds., 1993). On direct investment, see Mark Robinson,
Strengthening Civil Society in Africa: The Role of Foreign Political Aid, IDS BULL., Apr. 1995, at 70.
6. See, e.g., Mark Imber, Geo-Governance Without Democracy?: Reforming the UN System, in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY?: GLOBALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL DEMOCRACY 201 (Anthony G.
McGrew ed., 1997).
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liberalism and its contemporary manifestation as the twin phenomena of
structural adjustment and formal political liberalization.7
Globalization can be understood as a set of processes, trends, and
socioeconomic outcomes. My focus, though, is on the ideological package
that is promoted by those processes and that infuses them. This package is
called "neo-liberalism." Here, I follow the lead of Peter Wilkin's arguments
that globalization is a neo-liberal phenomenon and that the central notion
driving globalization is that freedom is "essentially and naturally about the
deepening and widening of private power."" As such, the enmeshing and
expansion of global relationships are intimately linked not only to the
economic and financial developments that we associate with g!obalization, but
also to the ideas and concepts that neo-liberal globalization promotes and,
indeed, by which globalization is promoted. These ideas and concepts are:
the free, rapid, and unburdened exchange of money, goods, or information; the
radical equality of all actors (sex, race, and location are irrelevant) who have
access to the means of engagement (be it capital, a web-site, or an airline
ticket); the rejection of the State; and the celebration of "private sector"
initiatives as more authentic and better able to promote diversity.
We can identify neo-liberal discourse in the pronouncements of
international agencies and in the actions of transnational operators, but this
Article focuseson the transmission of such ideas, perceptions, and self-
perceptions to ordinary Latin American citizens. In this sense, I look at
changes in the culture of Latin American polities, not in terms of the more
obvious cultural manifestations of clothes or music, but in relation to a new
cultural understanding promoted by the spread of neo-liberalism. I argue that
it is at the level of "common sense" understandings and perceptions that deep
changes occur.9 I examine in particular the activities of groups within civil
society, showing how social movements have developed and adapted to the
exigencies of globalizing liberalism. In doing so, I do not argue that a
revolution has taken place; but, that people and organizations have adapted
their ideas and activities in recent times, and as such, that significant
7. Here, structural adjustment is understood to seek open markets, minimal state intervention, and
fiscal austerity. See infra note 23. Political liberalization focuses on the establishment of institutions and
procedures associated with democracy.
8. Peter Wilkin, New Myths for the South: Globalization and the Conflict Betiveen Private Power
and Freedom, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOUTH 19 (Caroline Thomas & Peter Wilkin eds., 1997).
9. See generally Lucy Taylor, Text-book Citizens: Educationfor Democracy and Political Culture
in El Salvador, 6 DEMOCRATIZATION (1999) (examining political culture as an element of analysis); Lucy
Taylor, Political Culture and Democratization: Forging Democracy as "Common Sense" (manuscript on
file with author) (presenting a more in-depth discussion about political culture as an element of analysis).
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continuities and ambiguities can be identified. In the final section, I focus on
the expanding role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in facilitating
the promotion of neo-liberal understandings and argue that it is they who make
neo-liberalism bearable and possible. NGOs are most actively promoting neo-
liberal values, yet, paradoxically, they are simultaneously promoting a
participatory impulse that may defy the elitism of neo-liberal political
structures in Latin America.
I. LATIN AMERICA'S LIBERAL CONTEXT
Latin America offers the student of globalization an intriguing arena for
the analysis of phenomena and testing of hypotheses. The region suffers from
high levels of poverty, patchy patterns of development, massive inequalities
of wealth, and high incidences of criminal or informal employment, as do
many other "lesser developed" countries. Similarly, problems of migratory
displacement, environmental degradation, and the systematic suppression of
indigenous people and their cultures form a familiar social backdrop of the
"Third World." However, unlike Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations,
the countries of Latin America hold much in common with the West. They
have consolidated territories, clearly defined borders, and low incidences of
land-claim or invasion-type conflicts. In addition, they have a relatively long-
lived independent political history stretching, in most cases, to the mid-I 820s.
What is perhaps most striking, in contrast to other "Third World" countries,
is the clear predominance of liberalism as the central ideological principle."°
I do not claim that Latin American polities are embodiments of liberal values,
and I certainly deny that political history in Latin American polities has been
democratic and respectful of individual rights. Yet many of their fundamental
assumptions and idealized norms are rooted in liberal democratic discourse.
When we consider political history in the southern section of the American
continent, we see that from a military context based on wars of independence
was born a traditional, conservative, political elite rooted in Latin America's
landed wealth. Liberal parties emerged as a challenge to oligarchic rule,
created by the men (naturally) who were spearheading the capitalist revolution
10. See generally HOWARD J. WIARDA, THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA: HISTORY,
POLITICS, AND U.S. POLICY 3-57 (1990); LIBERALS, POLITICS, AND POWER: STATE FORMATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA (Vincent C. Peloso & Barbara A. Tenenbaum eds., 1996); JAIME
E. RODRIGUEZO., THE INDEPENDENCE OF SPANISH AMERICA 75-103 (1998) (discussing early representative
government).
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in the region. This revolution brought with it urbanization, mercantilism, and
a larger middle class." So far, the story, though taking place later than in
Western Europe, is a familiar one featuring franchise expansion, enhanced
civil and contractual rights, the development of parliamentary procedures, and
the curtailment of presidential powers. This is not to say that Latin America
was Western in its political outlook by 1920. Indeed, very non-liberal modes
of political interaction were, and in many places still are, prevalent, such as
clientelism, populism, repressive conservatism, and semi-feudal patronage
politics. However, a veneer and a rhetoric of liberalism persisted and became
familiar. Constitutions were drawn up to mirror those of the United States
(with a dash of French revolutionary ftaternitj and egalitg), and formal
electoral procedures were utilized even by the military as a way to legitimize
and strengthen a leader's claim to power. In short, the experience of
liberalism in Latin America has deep roots in striking contrast to other "Third
World" countries.
Such experience is not only resonant within the upper political echelons
of the polity; liberalism has meaning for many sectors of the lower classes too.
The period of industrial and manufacturing expansion, which occurred as a
reaction to the world depression of the 1930s, and the opportunities afforded
by the advent of war in Europe, led to the emergence of new political actors
and parties, including populists, Christian democrats, communists, and
socialists. Liberal values were perpetuated through the extension of the
franchise to the poor and to women and through the adoption of welfare
policies based on a discourse of socioeconomic rights that mirrored the
reconfiguration of liberalism in Western polities in the post-war period.'2
Other "Third World" countries were, meanwhile, struggling to rid themselves
of the colonizers, to imagine themselves as "nations," to adapt, adopt, or
invent political systems, to create communities of political opinion, and to
appropriate a (liberal) language and political system that had no experiential
roots in the lives of the ordinary citizens of these new polities. In this sense,
11. See Frank Safford, Politics, Ideology and Society in Post-Independence Spanish America, in 3
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 347 (Leslie Bethell ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984); see
also Paul Cammack, States andMarkets in Latin America, in THE MARKET AND THE STATE 138 (Michael
Moran & Maurice Wright eds., 199 1) (presenting a brief but incisive review of economic development and
its political consequences); Charles A. Hale, Political and Social Ideas in Latin America, 1870-1930, in
4 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 367 (Leslie Bethell ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986).
12. The literature on this period is vast. For a country-based introduction, see 4 DEMOCRACY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LATIN AMERICA (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1989). For a general analysis, see
E. BRADFORD BURNS, LATIN AMERICA: A CONCISE INTERPRETIVE HISTORY (6th ed. 1994); THOMAS C.
WRIGHT, LATIN AMERICA IN THE ERA OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (1991 ).
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then, Latin America was already inserted into earlier waves of globalizing
influence based on the spread of federalist principles and liberal ideas, as well
as the nineteenth century expansion of capitalism. It makes sense historically,
ideologically, and in people's own lives; yet Latin America is, in common
with its "Third World" counterparts, not in control of the dominant discourse
or the ideological or financial engines of globalization.
The specific object of study in this Article is "civil society.' 13 As a region
that has undergone a transition towards democracy in the last twenty years, the
presence and role of civil society has been expanding dramatically because of
two contradictory, yet complementary, dynamics. These dynamics include the
mobilization of ordinary people as advocates of a democratic political system
(social movements), and the utilization of private entities, such as NGOs, in
accordance with the neo-liberal strategy that promotes the use of social
organizations in the solution of social and economic problems. These two
dynamics are central to the story of globalization and liberalization; even
though rooted in opposed traditions, the two meet in the social arena to
produce a whole range of results and relationships that are broadly classified
as the operation of civil society. 4
Such developments have been encouraged, in part by the expansion of
international linkages between movements in the north and south, to create
transnational social movements, especially in relation to "global" issues such
as the environment." Also, social organizations have utilized the virtual
infrastructure of the Internet to foster the fabrication of more dense patterns
of connection and to expand knowledge and support for their causes.
Typically, here, we might think of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas,
13. The theoretical literature on social movements, civil society, and NGOs is vast. See generally
JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1992) (discussing civil
society); JOHN A. HALL, CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY, COMPARISON (1995); DONATELLA DELLA
PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION (1999); Ana Maria Bejarano,
Democracia y Sociedad Civil: Una Jntroducci6n Teorica, 15 ANALISIS POLITICA 68 (1992); Craig
Calhoun, Civil Society and the Public Sphere, 5 PUB. CULTURE 267 (1993); ParthaChatterjeeA Response
to Taylor's "Modes of Civil Society, "3 PUB. CULTURE 119 (1990); Charles Taylor, Modes of Civil Society,
3 PUB. CULTURE 95 (1990).
14. See Matthias Finger, NGOs and Transformation: Beyond Social Movement Theory, in
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN WORLD POLITICS: LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL (Thomas Princen &
Matthias Finger eds., 1994) (theorizing NGOs in relation to social movements); PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE
GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE TRANSITIONAL RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTED NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS 2-27 (Peter Willets ed., 1982).
15. See JEAN GRUGEL, European NGOs and Democratization in Latin America, in DEMOCRACY
WITHOUT BORDERS: TRANSNATIONALIZATION AND CONDITIONALITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (1999);
Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled-Issue Netvorks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L
ORG. 411 (1993) (examining North-South NGO relations).
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Mexico. There is little doubt that a "global" civil society is emerging. 6 Some
authors view this new globalizing civil society as an important element in
creating a plurality of political views, and therefore, a potential opposition to
the dominant global actors; 17 others see it as being an essential component in
creating a global democracy. 8 Linkages within and between NGOs and the
major funding agencies have also reinforced the globalizing trend, and the
funding agencies have been instrumental in creating and supporting fledgling
groups in an effort to create an indigenous civil society. This proliferation has
occurred especially in Africa and Central America, where civil society is
currently the major focus of energy, investment, and democratic hope. 9
A. The Social Movement Dynamic
The recent history of Latin American politics has seen the advent of the
social movement as a major political actor. Typically, these movements grew
up under conditions of dictatorship and focused on a single issue, although
participants were often supporters (if not active members) of other social
organizations. Examples include human rights groups, women's movements,
indigenous rights networks, environmental movements, and shantytown
organizations. °  Essentially, the affiliates were leftward-leaning, and the
leaderships of these groups were often drawn from political party activists and
16. See CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 1; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Reconstructing World Politics: The
Emergence of Global Civil Society, 21 MILLENNIUM 389 (1992).
17. See, e.g.. PAUL EKINS, A NEW WORLDORDER: GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS FOR GLOBAL CHANGE
(1992); Richard Falk, The Global Promise of Social Movements: Explorations at the Edge of Time, 12
ALTERNATIVES 173 (1987); Martin Shaw, Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements
Approach, 23 MILLENNIUM 647 (1994).
18. See DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER 219-86 (1995); see also COSMOPOLITAN
DEMOCRACY: AN AGENDA FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER (Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995).
19. See Fantu Cheru, New Social Movements: Democratic Struggles and Human Rights in Africa,
in GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 145 (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996); Robinson, supra note 5.
20. Much has been published on Latin American social movements, often focusing on detailed
research-based analysis. Two texts which bring together a diversity of issues and movements are POWER
AND POPULAR PROTEST: LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Susan Eckstein ed., 1989), and THE
MAKING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA: IDENTITY, STRATEGY AND DEMOCRACY (Arturo
Escobar & Sonia E. Alvarez eds., 1992). For examples on women's issues, see THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA (Jane S. Jacquette ed., 1989); WOMEN AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA
(Elizabeth Jelin ed. & J. Ann Zammit & Marilyn Thomson trans., 1990). On human rights, see REPRES16N
POLITICA Y DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (Hugo E. Frahling ed., 1986); Kathryn Sikkink,
The Emergence, Evolution and Effectiveness of Latin American Human Rights Network, in CONSTRUCTING
DEMOCRACY: HUMAN RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA (Elizabeth Jelin & Eric
Herschberg eds., 1996). On race issues, see PETER WADE, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN LATIN AMERICA 95-I 10
(1997).
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the middle classes. Social movements became key political protagonists in
combating military repression, organizing resistance to authoritarian rule,
publicizing human rights and other violations being committed by the armed
forces, and campaigning for equality founded on gender or race.2 The
cornerstone of such organizations was the daily practice of popular democratic
procedures. Typically, decisions were made according to a consensus reached
through a process of discussion and negotiation in which everyone would take
part, and leadership posts were filled either by rotation or through elections.
The watchwords were participation, rights, tolerance, listening, and
transparency.22 These ideals were held to be of value not only in their own
right, but also in sharp contrast to the coercion, violence, and exclusion of
authoritarian rule-as such, they held symbolic, as well as practical,
importance.
During the 1980s, such groups called themselves popular organizations;
they acknowledged themselves to be part of a national and international issue
movement. They also understood that they were woven into the fabric of a
wider national or regional social movement that had a clear mandate to oppose
the government and military in their country and to denounce authoritarianism
and repression elsewhere. In a context defined by the Cold War and by
supposedly knowable moral absolutes, the social movements ignored the
ambiguities of political life and embraced the good-bad dichotomy that, in
fairness, did make some sense when torturers occupied the presidential palace.
The advent of formal democracy, though, misted the mirror of clarity and
heralded a time of confusion, disillusion, and a reassessment of the
movements' assumptions and goals. Simultaneously, the newly democratic
finance ministries embarked upon (or continued with) structural adjustment,
and governments began to articulate neo-liberal interpretations of citizen,
government, economy, society, and the global context. Economic and
political liberalization arrived together and shared a common view of the
future conditioned by the impact of global norms; "popular organizations"
thus became reworked in neo-liberal parlance as "civil society."
21. See LuCY TAYLOR, CITIZENSHIP, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY: CHANGING DYNAMICS IN
CHILE AND ARGENTINA 47-59 (1998).
22. For an examination of human rights groups, see Jennifer G. Schirmer, Those Who Die for Life
Cannot be Called Dead: Women and Human Rights Protests in Latin America, FEMINIST REV., Summer
1989, at 3. However, it should be noted that many groups did not live up to such high and often rhetorical
ideals.
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B. The Neo-Liberal Dynamic
The neo-liberal dynamic that has developed since the late 1970s has a
completely opposite location on the politico-ideological spectrum.23 It is
linked to a series of policies and an overarching philosophy that emanated
from the radical right, associated with Prime Minister Thatcher and President
Reagan in the West, and General Pinochet in Latin America. A neo-liberal
discourse infuses the language of major global institutions, conditions the
policies that are prescribed (and indeed vetoed) by them, and forms the
ideational foundation for the globalization of information, the notion of
"world culture" and transnational news networks. Here, I am interested in
discussing just one channel for the diffusion of neo-liberal norms-civil
society.
The relationship between neo-liberalism and civil society is overlooked
by many analysts who take their cue from neo-liberal theory and rhetoric and
focus on the market and individualism.24 The market requires the components
that supply and demand goods, services, and labor act in their own best
interests and for their own benefit. Thus, individuals compete with one
another in order to maximize their satisfaction, and this competition inevitably
puts them in an antagonistic position vis-,i-vis their neighbors, other workers,
and other consumers. In contrast, the idea of civil society is rooted in notions
of solidarity, altruism, and combining forces to achieve goals, conjuring
images of charity events or civic associations. Are people individuals, or can
they function as a community? How is it that solidarity and individualism can
be combined?
Here, we need to return to the principles of neo-liberal freedom. The
essence of freedom for neo-liberals is to be able to do what one wants without
recourse to coercion and to be as free as possible to decide what one wills,
desires, or believes to be correct: I can do as I wish, so long as I do not
impinge on the freedom of others without their consent.25 However, there are
plenty of areas where we may well agree with the suggestion of a neighbor or
find common cause with another citizen; although putting that idea into action
may well imply the need for compromise, we might view the end result as
23. For key authors of the neo-liberal approach, see FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM (1976); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). For a useful introductory
discussion of neo-liberalism, see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN
INTRODUCTION 95-159 (1990).
24. For a detailed discussion of neo-liberal citizenship, see TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 10-30.
25. See NOZICK, supra note 23, at 309-34.
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presenting a greater good (to ourselves) than the loss of a modicum of
freedom. For example, resisting the establishment of a rubbish dump at the
end of the street, in conjunction with proposing the reclamation of this
wasteland and construction of a children's playground, presents an
opportunity for the realization of a "selfish" goal that requires us to act in
concert with others. The result might not accord with our ideal outcome, and
it may well oblige us to give up our time and expend our energies (thus
restricting our freedom). Nonetheless, as rational actors geared towards the
optimization of our "utopias," we may believe that the sacrifice is worth the
effort in the long run. This rational sacrifice is the foundation for the
establishment of a neo-liberal civil society, in which individual actors residing
in society freely choose to compromise their freedom for a perceived greater
long-term benefit.
Such a concept of civil society also accords with the demands of neo-
liberals in an ideological sense. Social organizations composed of freely
associated individuals are private entities just as much as businesses, for they
are open to challenges for position, hegemony, or funding from other similarly
constituted organizations. They compete with these organizations through
mechanisms of the supply of social goods and respond to a demand that
emanates from the desires and needs of individuals and communities in a
market not composed of prices, commodities, and wages, but of values,
projects, and human resources. They are autonomous of government (though
they may choose to work with entities such as municipalities) and answer to
those who constitute their membership (who have agreed to forego their
modicum of freedom) by effectively providing solutions or other goods such
as companionship, the incidental learning of new skills, or personal
satisfaction.
Within such an understanding of civil society, NGOs occupy a conceptual
space between social organizations and business enterprises. For example,
NGOs that train women to become self-employed hairdressers or pastry-
makers must act as businesses in relation to external actors such as funding
bodies or the State.26 They must demonstrate efficiency, probity, and financial
soundness in their role as the implementers of policies sponsored by the State,
aid organizations, or international NGOs; they compete to take on such a role
through a system of project funding through competitive tendering. However,
their relationship to the body of clients they intend to service is seldom
26. The gendered interpretation oftasks in this example reflects common practice among mainstream
Latin American NGOs, not my preferences.
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motivated purely by economic reasoning, as almost by definition, NGOs are
non-profit organizations. Their motives, rather, are based on a sense of moral
purpose founded on a desire to help those less fortunate , as well as on an
emotive bond of solidarity with a group of people with whom they sense an
affinity or for whom they feel a responsibility. As such, NGOs respond to two
sets of actors: (1) those who provide finance (in which case the actors must
prove their social and economic value and efficiency); and (2) those whose
interests are central to their task (by exercising fairness, understanding, and
moral probity, as well as by providing an effective and meaningful service).
The identity of the NGO, therefore, forces it to cultivate two identities, and
often the constraints or impulses that each impose or prompt may frequently
come into conflict.
Essentially, the dilemmas faced by NGOs working in the field crystallize
around the crucial difference between the vision of social movements and the
neo-liberal concept of civil society. Social movements have a political
agenda. Neo-liberal civil society has social and essentially practical aims.
While social movement activists understand that their activities are rooted in
their desire to change the world rather than improve their own backyard, neo-
liberalism's "non-political" approach is nevertheless political. It responds to
ideological impulses and translates them, through civil society, into actions
which have particular political repercussions.
C. Social Movements, NGOs, and Globalization
These essentially political divisions are also mirrored in organizations
located at the international level. Taking human rights as an example, we
might compare and contrast "leftward-leaning" groups, such as Human Rights
Watch, with the more conservative and increasingly neo-liberal organizations,
such as Freedom House or the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
Naturally, each tends to work with its ideological counterpart in the field. The
influence of such organizations has been substantial for many years now, but
it has tended to be concentrated upon lobbying Western governments,
exposing violations of rights at the international level, or applying pressure to
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authoritarian regimes." Indeed, both Freedom House and the NED were
heavily involved in promoting democracy alongside the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) in countries such as Nicaragua and Chile and were actively
engaged in providing ideological information, training, and funding for pro-
democracy projects.28
With the advent of formal democracy and the intensification of the
globalizing dynamic, linkages between north and south have become more
dense in terms of the interchange of ideas and the flow of finance.
Movements construct themselves on this web and gather adherents from
across the world, while NGO activists, who are sufficiently professional,
connected, and organized, participate in conferences in Miami or Mexico City.
Popular organizations too often have strong international connections. During
the dictatorships, solidarity organizations operated in Western countries and
were supported both politically, and often financially, by the raising and
remittance of donations (e.g., the Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign in the United
Kingdom). Another major source of connections comes through exile
communities that maintain strong links with the "homeland" and often sponsor
pro-democracy initiatives financially and politically (e.g., the Nicaraguan
communities of Miami who fled Sandinista Nicaragua).
The globalization of civil society identified by many scholars has,
however, created a qualitatively different phenomenon. The former
organizations were founded on a political commitment based on lived
experience, emotional responses, and moral positions. Increasingly, such
organizations are fading into the background (e.g., Westerners turn their
attention to Rwanda or Bosnia while exiles return home) and are being
replaced by more business-like organizations staffed by Western, professional
development experts who-though they are often motivated by political
commitment-are nevertheless career-oriented. Such changes have, of course,
been encouraged by developments in the allocation of international financial
aid and the globalization of communications media. They also align with the
neo-liberal concepts of emphasis on "private" initiative rather than public
27. For an assessment of the work of the Human Rights Watch, see WILLIAM KOREY, NGO's ANDTHE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: "A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE" 339-67 (1998). For information
on Amnesty International, see Martin Ennals, Amnesty International and Human Rights, in PRESSURE
GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTED NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 63-83 (Peter Willets ed., 1982).
28. For an account of United States sponsored NGOs in Chile, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Philippines,
see WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, U.S. INTERVENTION AND
HEGEMONY (1996). For an analysis of Freedom House and its role in promoting democracy, see KOREY,
supra note 27, at 443-67; WIARDA, supra note 10, at 143-68.
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donation and the allocation of morally-laden goods through the most efficient
(and thus morally superior) mechanisms. These concepts are combined with
intellectual ideas of free interaction and the exchange of ideas and experiences
(mirroring the market), plus concepts of people's equal value and the profound
inherent dignity associated with neo-liberalism. This facilitating global
climate, with the increasing density of connections between the donor and
recipient regions, is the third element in our analysis of the role of civil society
in promoting neo-liberal values among ordinary Latin American citizens.
II. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LIFE AT THE GRASSROOTS
It might appear that the two dynamics emanating from social movements
and from neo-liberal civil society would lead to division, opposition, and
conflict in the social arena or that a change in discourse from "popular
organization" to "civil society" would herald a major change at the base.
However, more accurately, we should characterize relations in the social arena
as reflecting the gradual molding and adaptation of social movements to the
developing ideological context as well as the accommodation of business-like
NGOs to the realities and ambiguities of "real" life at the base. This Part
explores how the social and political relationships that are associated with
social movements have been transformed by political liberalization
(democratization) and the development of NGOs. The Part that follows
explores these issues in light of globalization's politico-ideological message.
A. The New Context: Political Liberalization
The type of restricted, low-intensity, elitist democracy that prevails in
Latin America (and, one could easily argue, more generally in the West)
actively seeks to exclude the participation of grassroots organizations. 9 This
point is imperative because structural adjustment causes hardship and
suffering for many people (at least in the short term), and social movements
are built on a tradition of representing such sectors and denouncing such
problems. In order to avoid demonstrations, disruptions, and serious unrest,
29. Such authors include JAMES PETRAS & MORRIS MORLEY, LATIN AMERICA IN THE TIME OF
CHOLERA: ELECTORAL POLITICS, MARKET ECONOMICS AND PERMANENT CRISIS (1992); Paul Cammack,
Democratisation: A Review of the Issues, 4 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 39 (1985); Barry Gills & Joel
Rocamora, Low Intensity Democracy, 13 THIRD WORLD Q. 501 (1992); Timothy M. Shaw & Fahimul
Quadir, Democratic Development in the South in the Next Millennium: What Prospects for Avoiding
Anarchy and Authoritarianism?, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOUTH, supra note 8.
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those who implement policies need to construct legitimacy. The dovetailing
of political and economic liberalization can be seen as the conscious
construction of a regime that diffuses objection to the hardship associated with
structural adjustment by maintaining a legal, accountable, and formally
responsive government. Thus, structural adjustment requires legitimacy, not
coercion, in order to implement successfully difficult economic measures. It
is better to buy patience than to force a grudging (and therefore unstable)
consent. Such developments create a new institutional context that, while
providing relative security for activists, changes the nature of social movement
activity.0
First, the relationship of social movements to the "other" has changed
dramatically. Social organizations have greatly enhanced the possibility of
interaction with government or State agencies, and the days of simply
branding the activities of government and State as being illegitimate and
wrong are over. Such governments do have legitimacy bestowed by the (often
hard-won) electoral process; provided that the elections were relatively free
and fair, social organizations are now placed in the position of having to
justify themselves and to "prove" that their claim to legitimacy is higher than
the president's. Such difficulties are often compounded by much closer
personal relationships to those in power. Often, social activists went on to
stand for and be elected to positions of representation either in government or
in political parties. Social leaders were also brought in to work in government
agencies, such as human rights commissions or women's agencies. The
melding of the personal and the political position compromises all concerned:
the individuals, who often genuinely attempt to bring the demands and ideas
of the grassroots to bear in the decision-making or policy-making process; the
social movements, who are forced either to accept the necessary negotiation
and middle-ground position of the State or party or to be excluded from access
to power; the officers (whether elected or employed by the State), who must
choose between institutional or party loyalty and their grassroots comrades;
and the State itself, which must at least nod meaningfully in the direction of
the social movements to whom the new incumbents owe a debt of political
support." From certainty, all must embrace ambiguity in this transition from
politics as moral stance to politics as practicable compromise.
30. 1 have argued some of the following points in greater detail in Lucy Taylor, Strangers in
Democracy: Problems of Social Movements in the Process of Democratic Consolidation, in CONTEMP.
POL. STUD. 1069 (Joni Lovenduski & Jeffrey Stanyer eds., 1995).
31. This sort of thing occurred particularly in Chile. See TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 93-123.
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Second, social organizations must also accommodate themselves to the
new institutional reality that is defined (more or less) in terms of a return to
the rule of law and to a "normalization" of political relationships. Thus,
activities that were considered to be legitimate under conditions of
authoritarian rule, but that were formally illegal, cannot now be undertaken.
For example, "lightening" actions, such as unauthorized demonstrations, the
painting of murals on public buildings without a permit, or the staging of "sit-
ins" in the municipal offices or law courts, are no longer sanctionable;
movements must find new, institutionalized ways to make their point. This
change is necessary not only to avoid the legal consequences, but also to avoid
the alienation of support in the wider community. Moreover, the advent of
predictable politics also implies the demise of "emergency" political
decisionmaking, and issues such as representation and accountability within
organizations come to the fore. Such issues are made more apparent by the
need for social organizations to become "legalized." "Legalization" requires
that these organizations take on a judicial personality, declare who their
officers are, explain how they are elected, present accounts to the membership,
and hold at least a few formal meetings.
Political liberalization urges social movements to adopt the procedural
trappings of formal liberal democracy, and this creates tensions within
organizations, particularly because this formalization conflicts with the spirit
of "popular democracy" that they formerly practiced. They seem to have more
opportunities to participate, but the nature of that participation is molded and
confined by an institutional context that reflects not only liberal norms (rights,
representation, and rule of law) but also neo-liberal values such as autonomy,
subsidiarity, competition, and apolitical organization in the social sphere.
Social movements, therefore, have been hugely influenced by the new
institutional context that has obliged them, essentially, to become more
professionalized and circumspect in their actions. Such changes are
associated with the processes ofglobalization that prescribe formal democratic
institutionalization as the most secure political regime with which to nurture
and protect the globalizing financial order and neo-liberal orthodoxy.
B. From Social Movement to NGO
Social organizations were not, however, the passive, malleable objects of
liberal democratization. They also rethought their own position and their role
both in the new democracies and in the context of globalization. Working at
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subsistence income levels and under intense emergency conditions was
acceptable during times of political danger and urgency. However, once
formal political normality had been reintroduced, many activists either drifted
away from social activity to reconstruct their own shattered lives, left the
arena in a state of exhaustion and anti-climactic disillusion, or decided to
"turn professional" and transform their social organizations into NGOs. It is
important to point out that, along with those which transformed themselves
from "popular organizations" into NGOs, the advent of formal democracy saw
the flowering of many new non-governmental groups. These groups were
sometimes set up by returning exiles, (particularly in Nicaragua) or resulted
from the splintering of social organizations whose unity buckled under the
pressure of the new political conditions.32 Either way, NGOs have become
central actors in the domestic politics of Latin America, particularly in their
role as "private" implementers of government policy. As such, NGOs take
neo-liberal values to the heart of communities and social issues that once were
thought to be the preserve of social movements.
The professionalization associated with NGOs has a subtle, though not
insubstantial, impact on the nature of social organizations, and in particular,
on the relationships between NGO workers and ordinary people. Once the
common cause of fighting "the Generals," "Contras," or "Sandinistas" was
formally removed, tensions mounted as differences of opinion, background,
and political affiliation began to emerge. This increased hierarchical
structuring became formalized with the redefinition of many social
organizations such as NGOs. The educated middle classes became
"professionals" and "problem solvers" who imparted their knowledge and
insights to the "client population," who were "problem bearers." Thus,
relationships based on common cause and trust have been subtly transformed
by the reemergence of the unequal distribution of power, clout, and human
resources, as well as the introduction of a market culture, focusing on value-
for-money, the "selling" of solutions, and the right of the consumer to
satisfaction.33
32. See id. at 135-69.
33. By no means have all grassroots organizations undergone such a transformation; human rights
groups in particular remain strongly bonded to their "client" base through the intensity of emotional
investment and the potent linkage between moral and political sentiments. Moreover, professionalization
does not necessarily imply cynical manipulation; those middle class professionals who work with the poor
or with women retain a strong and genuine commitment to working for the benefit of their "client"
communities.
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Such a transformation is intimately linked to the perceptions of Western
governments and international agencies, particularly in relation to funding
issues. During the dictatorships, those governments, agencies, or solidarity
groups that wished to fund pro-democracy initiatives (broadly understood)
would donate funds directly to the social organizations involved. Contact was
made either directly through personal relationships (often via exile
communities) or was mediated through domestic or international NGOs acting
as intermediaries. For some actors, such as the Scandinavian governments or
solidarity groups, such money was channeled into broadly anti-dictatorship
groups or perhaps into more specific projects such as women's health groups
or indigenous people's rights groups. For other actors, such as the National
Endowment for Democracy or the International Republican Institute, monies
were focused towards anti-rebel groups in Central America or mainstream
liberal democratic initiatives in the Southern Cone.34 Either way, funds
carried an explicit political tag and the broader issues of Cold War, left-right
politics were considered to be at least as important as the financing of the
projects concerned. Partly as a result of this tagging, and partly because of the
clandestine practices necessary to protest action during this period,
considerable leeway was afforded to the domestic recipients, and issues such
as accountability, budgeting, and financial planning, among others, were
placed at a low priority while political goals were paramount. Social
organizations could often divert funds from one source to another, allowing
them to channel money to maintain the day-to-day upkeep of the group or to
respond to emergencies (such as the need to get someone out of the country);
in Central America, monies were also sometimes diverted to the "war effort."
With the advent of formal democracy, though, funding issues changed
dramatically. Essentially, the political aim of the recipient group and political
motives of the donor became much less clear-cut. "Democracy" had been
achieved and now those who held domestic power were representatives
accountable to the electorate. Accountability led to two trends. First, the
donors were less willing to give money broadly to "further the struggle for
democracy" and began shifting towards the funding of specific projects.
Second, governments and larger financial organizations began to give aid to
the new, democratic government (legitimate in the eyes of the international
34. For a detailed and well-informed analysis of NGOs and democratic consolidation, see LAURA
MCDONALD, SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF NGOS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1997).
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community, and formally, within the domestic political arena) for reallocation
to domestic NGOs working in nominated fields, such as education for
citizenship, training programs for young people, preventative medicine
projects, etc. These changes had the effect of shifting the emphasis away from
political activism and towards social development while at the same time
giving greater political control to domestic governments. Here, then, we see
a paradoxical shift away from international relationships and towards a
domestic focus for civil society.3"
What once were politically motivated social organizations have now often
become professional NGOs concerned with budgets, performance-related
criteria, and the measurement of project success rather than with meeting to
discuss the forthcoming demonstration, raising the consciousness of women,
or overthrowing the authoritarian government. A tangible change has taken
place and it is here, where globalizing liberalism interacts with domestic
political change, that a culture based on neo-liberal understandings has its
greatest opportunity and potential impact.
III. GLOBALIZATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY
It is plain that the dominant economic orthodoxy in Latin America is
based on neo-liberal policies, manifested as structural adjustment, and is
underpinned by the values and political structures of Western-style liberal
democracy. Across the region, governments are pursuing public spending
austerity, privatization, monetary stabilization based on control of inflation,
the reorientation of development towards export markets based on primary
production, and the development of free trade zones. That this adjustment is
inspired by the rhetoric and arguments of a Western economic elite and is
enforced by the strictures and demands of the major global financial bodies
is also undeniable. What is often overlooked, though, is how these policies
are accommodated within countries where poverty and high unemployment
are overwhelming obstacles to the acceptance of such policies by substantial
sections of the population. It is here that NGOs and the "new civil society"
35. See Lucy Taylor, Market Forces and Moral Imperatives: The Professionalizalion of Social
Activism in Latin America, in DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BOUNDARIES: TRANSNATIONALISATION AND
POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (Lucy Taylor ed., forthcoming 1999).
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ethos play their role in promoting the globalizing liberal initiative. 6 They do
so in two interconnected ways: (1) by providing practical solutions to
socioeconomic problems; and (2) by endorsing or advocating a neo-liberal
understanding of political and social life.
A. Civil Society and Social Development
The central problem, in terms of domestic political support that new
democratic politicians faced in Latin America, was how to maintain support
for their governments while simultaneously enacting policies that would cause
hardship and distress to wide sections of the population. Fortunately,
however, they could implement social policies that utilized the expanding
ranks of NGOs inhabiting an increasingly more crowded civil society. Even
more fortunately, this strategy was compatible with the broad neo-liberal
ideological thrust and solved one of its least popular consequences.37
The government's problems were simple: they had to respond to poverty;
they had to improve infrastructure; they had to promote education and re-
skilling; and they had to ensure a healthy workforce and citizenry. Yet, they
were simultaneously engaged in privatization and huge public spending
cutbacks. The way they could achieve both ends was through the deployment
of NGOs that would act to provide such public goods but with the funding of
private capital. This solution was clearly facilitated by the channeling of aid
via newly democratic governments which could then direct that aid towards
specific goals by employing NGOs at the base as implementers of projects
answering these specific goals. Thus, the government could make a political
impact through social development projects, but it was neither responsible for
funding such projects nor positioned directly in the firing line at the base
should anything go awry. NGOs were the preferred vehicle not only for such
cynical reasons, but also because the drive to diminish the State in favor of
private intervention in social policy made NGOs ideal partners. First, they
36. On the role of social movements toward the consolidation of democracy in Latin America, see
Jorge J. Roblero, Movimientos soicalesyconcertacidnsocial enAmirica Latina, May 29, 1992, at 167-88;
Larry Diamond, Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 4 (1994).
37. See Peter Evans, Introduction: Development Strategies Across the Public-Private Divide, 24
WORLD DEV. 1033 (1996). For parallels with African cases, see Alan Fowler, The Role of NGOs in
Changing State-Society Relations: Perspectives from Eastern and Southern Africa, 9 DEV. POL'Y REV.
53 (1991).
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fulfill the market criteria of competitiveness by tendering for projects or
funds, which (it is argued) ensures that they are efficient and innovative while
remaining free from the distortions of patronage. Moreover, NGOs operate
in the social sphere and at the local level; as such, they are divorced from the
formal political sphere and facilitate the devolution of policy implementation
to the lowest point. Thus, they help to fulfill the neo-liberal principle of
subsidiarity." For neo-liberals, then, NGOs provide a means of implementing
policies in the most efficient manner while maintaining overall policy control
at the center, through the identification of policy priorities and the allocation
of funding to preferred candidates (while also allowing leeway for the veto of
"undesirable organizations").
NGOs are also ideal vehicles for policy implementation from the point of
view of many grassroots activists, and this is key to their success. NGO
activists are often well-known to the communities in which they work, having
built up relationships forged in the crucible of struggle against the
dictatorships. These activists know the key protagonists as well as the
particular problems of the community, and in turn, they are known and trusted
more readily by the community than are "outsiders." Many of the techniques
and strategies that they use have been tried and tested in the field, and thus,
are likely to produce good results early in the project's trajectory; sometimes
the project is a continuation or expansion of initiatives already implemented
in the community. Evidently, these benefits also have positive implications
for the government; projects that run smoothly reflect favorably on the
incumbent leadership. Additionally, governments do not have to waste time
training staff or pilot-testing projects; they can start immediately.
During periods of authoritarian rule, social organizations concerned with
economic development favored those people vulnerable to structural
adjustment by providing them with alternative sources of income and new
skills. This provision was undertaken by promoting sustainable development
(e.g., hydroponic cultivation of vegetables for community use), small-scale
production of foodstuffs (e.g., community bakeries), and the household
manufacture of goods for sale (e.g., commonly handmade crafts or artifacts).
These initiatives were community-based, often organized as cooperatives, and
were understood to have a political role in building solidarity, promoting
38. See TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 145-52.
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participation, and providing a focal point for organization and activism. With
the demise of authoritarian rule, the perceived urgency for such overtly
political programs waned, and it was not a difficult step for organizations and
communities alike to move towards development-oriented initiatives that
focused more on individuals and their families in the context of a community.
"Community" was recast as a social entity rather than a political powerhouse.
People were concerned with reconstructing their own lives, and as structural
adjustment led to unemployment and falling incomes, NGOs turned their
attention to retraining workers by educating them in new skills. Especially
popular were courses that prepared people for self-employment (e.g., as a
mechanic or a hairdresser) and taught the prospective entrepreneurs about law,
accounting, marketing, and advertising, as well as new trades. Often, projects
focused on vulnerable groups such as women, young people, or the long-term
unemployed; as such, they were understood to be progressive. They
''empower" women to take economic control over their lives; they tackle
issues such as drug or alcohol abuse among the young; and they provide new
opportunities for men whose traditional areas of employment (manufacturing
or industry) were in serious economic decline. Such economic development
programs have subtly swapped a rhetoric of political empowerment for a
rhetoric of socioeconomic empowerment by educating and equipping people
with the skills and organizational tools for coping with the harsh realities of
contemporary capitalism. A discourse of political participation has been
reworked as a discourse of neo-liberal participation in the market, helping to
reinvigorate the national economy and to facilitate the nation's economic
success.
Another major concern of "ordinary" people that has been transformed
by the neo-liberal logic is community improvement. Poor infrastructure and
the lack of facilities have been legacies of authoritarian rule in most of the
region's countries and have been specifically targeted for social development
by both NGOs and governments. Such development is particularly well-
advanced in Chile, where the impetus for local development (e.g., paving
roads, improving the provision of essential services, and building community
centers) has emerged because of the democratization of local government.39
39. See Alex Rosenfeld et al., La situacion de los gobiernos locales en Chile, in DESCENTRALIZACION
Y DEMOCRACIA: GOBIERNOS LOCALES EN AMERICA LATINA 185-239 (Jordi Borja et al. eds., 1989); see
also Jonathan Fox, Latin America's Emerging Local Politics, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1994, at 105.
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In this case, it is often residents' groups, not NGOs, that undertake the
organization of such initiatives. The small scale, limited budget, and parochial
ambitions of such projects should not fool us into ignoring the businesslike
personas that such community organizations and their leaderships take on.
They must analyze their problems, propose solutions, design projects, apply
for funding, and compete with other community organizations. Once the
project has been realized, the organization must report to the funding body to
which it, along with the community, is accountable. Thus, a neo-liberal civil
society functions to provide answers to local problems-answers that are not
imposed from above but are generated from below-via organizations that
embrace the decentralization of policy implementation and which utilize
talents and initiatives that emanate from the community itself. Such local,
social, and particularized development initiatives help to promote neo-liberal
values and notions such as competition, individualism, and the superior logic
of the market. Simultaneously, they answer the needs and ideas of ordinary
people, though only, of course, where the tendering for funding is successful.
B. Civil Society and Liberal Democracy
Social movements played a crucial role in transitions to democracy
throughout the region of Latin America, and as such, the relationship between
movement activism and democratization is an intimate one that is well proven.
Of interest here is the examination of the ideological orientation of social
movements and NGOs to discern the extent to which they are helping to
disseminate specifically neo-liberal understandings of democracy and
citizenship.
Central to most processes of democratization were human rights
campaigns. These campaigns sought to protect political prisoners from
arbitrary arrest, illegal imprisonment, torture, murder, and disappearance
while campaigning for the recognition and promotion of human rights.4"
Fundamental to such activities were the concept of the individual and the
principle that everyone has the right to life, to be free from torture, to be
treated equally before the law, and to be accorded due process. This principle
40. See. e.g., ALISON BRYSK, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA: PROTEST, CHANGE,
AND DEMOCRATIZATION (1994); see also REPRESION POLITICA Y DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
(Hugo E. Fruhling ed., 1986).
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embodies an understanding of rights that places at its center the inviolability
of the individual. As such, movements that were opposed to neo-liberalism
actually paved their way (though certainly inadvertently) by firmly
establishing the political personality of the individual rights-holder. In
challenging the repression meted out by the agents of the State, movements
were challenging the "right" of the State to dominate the lives of individual
citizens, to mold and engineer their existence, and to claim a "higher"
authority over ordinary people. This stance mirrors the fundamental position
adopted by neo-liberals who argue that coercion and manipulation by the State
in any guise (e.g., through planning or taxation) is equally unjustified. Those
politically opposed, therefore, were coincidentally acting in concert.4
With the advent of formal democracy, a new area of human rights work
has emerged that seeks to advance the process of democratization. This area
involves education for human rights or democracy. Projects in this area have
become a major focus for investment by the Ford Foundation for Democracy,
USAID, the international branches of both the Republican Party and the
Democratic Party of the United States, European governments, and the
European Union itself. In the Southern Cone, such organizations developed
around democratizing elections in order to teach people how to vote and to
encourage them to exercise that vote without fear of repression.42 In Central
America, teaching focuses on the constitution, the rights enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the mechanisms of the rule of
law.43 Indeed, Central America presents an interesting case (with the notable
exception of Costa Rica) because some liberal norms, such as the inviolability
of private property and a minimal role for the State, have been highly
prevalent without having been combined with democracy (as in South
America).. In Nicaragua, liberal democracy was defined by the Sandinista
regime as an empty sham that perpetuated inequalities of power, wealth, and
41. This argument is also advocated by David Held, who emphasized the common approach to the
individual of "left" and neo-liberal theorists. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 293-334 (2d ed.
1996).
42. Such groups include "Participa" and "Ideas" in Chile and "Poder Ciudadano" and "Conciencia"
in Argentina. See Helena Hidalgo, Estrellita de Belin, lengo que votary no sd par quien, NUEVOS AIRES
(Proyecto Educaci6n para la Democracia), Summer 199 1, at 20; Maria Inds Ruz, A quienesypara que se
capacita hay?, NUEvos AIRES (Proyecto Educaci6n para la Democracia), Summer 1991, at 22.
43. For examples, see "Iniciativa Social por la Democracia" (ISD) and "Comision Permanente por los
Derechos Humanos" (CPDH) in El Salvador, and "Centro de Educacion por la Democracia" (CED) and
"Hagamos Democracia" in Nicaragua.
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well-being. Instead, the Sandinistas advocated popular democracy that saw
a major role for some sectors (e.g., women and peasants) and communities in
the discussion and implementation of policy. Here, those at the forefront of
human rights education are drawn (broadly) from the right, and they advocate
the principles of a neo-liberal democracy. They place a high premium on
procedures (rather than ad hoc groupings), on issues of representation and
accountability (rather than "leadership" and "participatory meetings"), and on
the dignity of the individual rights-holder. Conversely, in El Salvador, formal
democratic procedures are being "taught" and advocated by all manner of
groups, including human rights organizations and social action groups
associated with the left. This diversification is occurring because El
Salvador's history featured political exclusion for the lower sectors, the
prevalence of political violence as a means of grievance expression or control,
and the systematic distortion and corruption of the means of representation
through government and redress via the law. As such, the advent of a rule of
law, free and fair elections, and political interaction guided by procedures
rather than coercion (e.g., the formal trappings of democracy) have been
embraced and heralded by the left as being a "progressive" move that will
allow ordinary citizens to become involved in politics, to raise their concerns
and voices, and to lay a meaningful claim to the title of citizen."
Again, we find that organizations that are ostensibly politically opposite
are selling the same story to their clients; that story is one of involvement,
dignity, self-determination, and equal human value. Both types of
organizations take the values of(neo-)liberalism and interpret them to suit the
context, to make sense of history, and to advance their own political
objectives. Crucially, also, both have a similar distaste for the State (the bMte
noir of neo-liberalism) and a similar liking for the individual, although for
very different reasons. For the right, the object is to counter the bureaucracy,
inefficiency, and sheer meddling of the State in people's lives. For the left,
the aim is to curb the political power of the government as articulated by the
State apparatus, particularly given people's experience of coercion and
violence by the agents of the State at the behest of authoritarian and
exclusionary governments. Both sides, meanwhile, identify the individual
citizen as the central political actor and see in her or him the potential for
44. I explore such issues in greater depth in Taylor, supra note 9.
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enhanced freedom, personal satisfaction, and the creation of a more fairly-run,
improved society.
The essential difference, though not often captured by the activists or the
communities themselves, is that the neo-liberal option advocates social
participation in the social sphere and in relation to socioeconomic goals. The
leftist option, however, promotes political participation in the social sphere
in relation to sociopolitical goals. The difference, therefore, hinges on where
power is deemed to be located (in the economy or in the political arena); how
that power is best contested (through participation in the market or
participation through political interaction); and what is right and proper for the
citizen's concern (everything understood to be economic or everything
understood to be political). At heart, the divergence relates to what is
understood to be driving the power engine: is it economic ingenuity or
political will? Such dual interpretations and parallel dynamics have emerged
throughout this analysis, and it is to the implications of such ambiguities for
the prospects of neo-liberal globalization in Latin America that I turn in the
conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The process of globalization is undoubtedly having a major impact on
Latin American polities. It is forcing governments, through direct intervention
and veto as well as through ideological-rhetorical persuasion, to adopt
economic policies that will facilitate the country's integration into the world
market. It is advocating, through aid allocation, encouragement, and the
promise of favorable treatment, that governments adopt liberal, democratic
political systems. While global economic integration finds little resonance
amongst the ordinary people of Latin America (given the hardship it entails),
aid and other benefits have long been a central demand of citizens who have
suffered under violent and exclusionary regimes. The key to the successful
integration of Latin American economies into the global free market and their
participation in the process of (neo-liberal) globalization is, therefore, the
promotion of neo-liberal understandings of the world through the efforts of
NGOs in their roles as providers of solutions that are both practical (i.e.,
socioeconomic development) and pedagogical (i.e., education for democracy).
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Latin America is well placed to "make sense" of the neo-liberal crusade.
This is because the fundamental character (the individual), the essential
mechanism (the market), and the founding premise (fairness through equality
of competition) of liberalism are familiar elements in the game of power. In
recent years, social movements and NGOs have also contributed to an
understanding of the dignity of the individual, the corruption and iniquitous
character of the State, and the empowering satisfaction that can be derived
from direct action and the solution of problems at the base.
Latin American governments have had little option but to embrace the
structural adjustment demanded by globalizing, neo-liberal economics, and the
advent of NGOs has allowed them to accommodate pressures from below.
This stability is not an insubstantial benefit given the fragility of many such
democracies. Governments have, moreover, set about constructing or
consolidating the new democracies according to a liberal (and often neo-
liberal) blueprint that, again, under the guise of democratization and through
the auspices ofsocial-movements-turned-NGOs, has been generally embraced.
Given the above, it appears likely that Latin America will become more
deeply, more rapidly, and more intricately linked to the process of
globalization. However, globalizing neo-liberalism may have sown the seeds
of a new challenge to its meteoric and near hegemonic rise. What brings
together and makes compatible the politically opposed dynamics of social
movement and neo-liberal civil society is the celebration of self-determination
that each espouses. At present, the role of NGOs is crucial in improving the
environment and life-chances of ordinary citizens and in building credibility
for neo-liberal governments and their policies. However, the urge to
participate and the neo-liberal direction of that participation may not remain
compatible forever, and political activism at the base might well re-emerge as
a counter-hegemonic force. Indeed, political developments, such as: the
impact of democratization; a rhetoric of rights which dignifies the lives and
hopes of the individual; the invocation that "individual citizens are
important;" the encouragement of organization at the base; the legitimization
of government accountability to its citizenry; and the flowering of all kinds of
autonomous organizations, could equally be said to encourage grassroots
democracy as much as neo-liberalism. Moreover, such a reinterpretation of
powerful citizenship might be facilitated by the contemporary development of
international norms around human rights, the purposeful intervention of
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international agencies in favor of elections, the growing power of international
NGOs, and NGOs' greater connection to indigenous partner groups, all of
which have developed as part and parcel of globalization. The development
of such political sites could provide a "global" home for democratizing
initiatives at the base.
Finally, then, it is necessary to emphasize that a specifically neo-liberal
globalization will not only depend on the relationships, actions, and strategies
of major international actors for its success, but also on the degree to which
its policies find resonance with the ordinary people who receive, adapt,
remold, accommodate new ideas from above, and who rework their own
political culture in the light of such changes. If we are discussing the future
of globalizing neo-liberalism, it is essential to understand that domestic
politics matter, that the domestic political context can have a favorable or
unfavorable impact on neo-liberalism's prospects, and that civil society has
a greater role than simply providing retraining, education in democracy, or a
new community center. Civil society is engaged in a political project that is
molding State-society relationships; that is, changing citizens' understanding
of themselves, their role in society, and the role of the State; and that is
"making sense" of the socioeconomic changes associated with the globalizing
capitalist imperative. Whether this project is always or necessarily a neo-
liberal imperative is another matter.
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